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The terminus of the Cold War in Eastern Europe is
often characterized by the fall of Communism and the rise of
capitalist governments. This narrative is only half true when
applied to Lithuania. Popular elections did occur peacefully
with the transition to multiparty power. Democracy was
successfully reintroduced, resulting in a new constitution.
With democracy asserting itself, it may seem logical that
economic reforms would as well. Despite being nicknamed
a Baltic Tiger, due to rapid economic growth, it would not
be accurate to describe Lithuania’s post-Soviet government
as a capitalist democracy until the 21st century.85 Instead of
supporting a privatized government, Lithuania’s first
presidential election was used to elect the former Communist
Party leader, Algirdas Brazauskas. Anatol Lieven, a
journalist in Vilnius during the revolution, wrote about his
experience in The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and the Path to Independence. Lieven argues that
Lithuanian independence ended with “disintegration of the
Soviet Union – as opposed to the end of Communism.”86
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Within two years of declaring independence, the old
regime was back in control of parliament and had
implemented measures to curb free market policies. The exCommunists governed Lithuania as the Democratic Labor
Party of Lithuania (LDDP) and remain politically influential
in 2020. Five of the seven total parliamentary elections in
Lithuania resulted in the LDDP coalition obtaining a ruling
majority. Lithuania’s political spectrum has continuously
swung between the free market-oriented Homeland Union
(TS) and the LDDP which supported a interventionist
approach to economics. Initially, in 1990, these two factions
were united in advocating a full economic and political break
from Russia and shift towards a free-market system. The first
leader of Lithuania’s multiparty Parliament (Seimas), was
Vytautas Landsbergis. Landsbergis was the head of a
coalition comprised of ex-Communists, economic
conservatives, and religious fundamentalists. Elections in
1992 resulted in an overwhelming loss for Landsbergis’s
coalition party, named The Movement (Sąjūdis).
Why did Lithuania reject Sąjūdis in favor of the
former Communist Party? Why has Lithuania supported
different political ideologies instead of favoring one
consistently? To answer these questions, another must first
be addressed: what determines Lithuanian political
activism? This paper will argue that Lithuanian political
activism is the conjunction of three main factors: economic
pragmatism, populist candidates, and a lack of strong
ideological affiliation. These motivations were significant
contributors to independence and continue to determine
political and economic outcomes in Lithuania.
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Moving Toward Democratic Elections
After losing independence in 1940, the former
Republic of Lithuania was governed by a single political
party. This was the Communist Party of Lithuania (LKP), a
puppet party of the Soviet Union. Because the party had such
strong ties to Moscow, Lithuanian concerns came second to
those of the Soviets. As long as the Soviet state remained
strong, so did the LKP’s authority in Lithuania. Despite
Moscow’s efforts to maintain stability and order, the Soviet
state did not remain strong. Growing dissatisfaction with
economic and political realities led to a rejection of the oneparty system by 1988. As a result, Soviet leaders were not
seen as truly representative of the people they governed. The
LKP responded to unrest by assigning the position of First
Secretary to Algirdas Brazauskas, who advocated for reform.
Despite this, political ambivalence and repression of the
local will culminated in one of the largest demonstrations in
human history, known as the Baltic Way.87 The protest was
largely inspired by the 50-year anniversary of and opposition
to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which illegally placed the
Baltics under Soviet control in 1940.88 Shortly before the
protests, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was revealed to be an
illegitimate partition of territory, contributing to erosion of
support for the Communist regime.
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Rejection of the LKP in 1989 increased populist
sentiment in Lithuania against the Soviet Union. Responding
to public discontent, The Academy of Sciences in Lithuania
formed a commission to propose changes to the
constitution.89 This led to a public meeting on June 3, 1988,
at the Academy in Vilnius. At this public meeting, the
institution’s proposals were drowned out by dozens of
independently-minded faculty. Instead of reforming the
current system, political autonomy was demanded. These
activists at the Academy in Vilnius called themselves the
Initiative Group, later known as the Movement (Sąjūdis).
Many future politicians were present, politically united
under Lithuania’s fist coalition party. Sąjūdis contained
staunch Communists and free market conservatives and
tended towards populism rather than anti-Communism.
Vytautas Landsbergis was among the professors
who raised the initial call for non-Communist parties. His
knowledge and use of ethnic poetry and literature inspired
nationalist sentiments. Landsbergis was a cultural expert
who used religious overtones to make profound and
impactful speeches. As a musicologist, Landsbergis was
perceived as detached from the Soviet bureaucracy, granting
him credibility when speaking about Lithuanian autonomy.
Having social ties in Kaunas and Vilnius, the largest centers
of population, helped Landsbergis assume a prominent
position within the Sąjūdis. Economic ruin may have
brought crowds together, but leaders such as Landsbergis
were capable of transforming them into an institutional
force.
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Sąjūdis organized a large rally to discuss proposing a
mandate on June 24, 1988. Speakers at the event included
the leadership of the future conservative party and socialist
parties. Public activism for these events is reported on the
Global Nonviolent Action Database page about the
Lithuanians Campaign for National Independence 19881991 and states that “20,000 people attended the second
demonstration where they heard speeches by Vytautas
Landsbergis (who would later become the leader of Sąjūdis)
and Algirdas Brazauskas (a Communist Party leader).”90
Brazauskas, speaking on behalf of Sąjūdis was a red herring,
he would later run against the party and its free market
agenda. In the initial stages of the revolution, conservatives
and ex-Communists showed more willingness to forge a
mutually beneficial path of compromise. The willingness to
work together as a revolutionary coalition quickly became
strained. Revolutionaries would later become rivals,
splintering the country’s political spectrum.
Sąjūdis in 1988 was more moderate and populist than
it would be during the post-Soviet era. The ideological
broadness of Sąjūdis constricted with the influx of
nationalist members. Kaunas, the second largest city in
Lithuania, quickly joined the nationalist discussion. The
Kaunas faction brought more adamant calls against
Communism and the existing bureaucracy to the Sąjūdis.
Membership in Sąjūdis from outside the capital, as Lieven
states, led directly to the “gradual takeover and
radicalization by representatives from Kaunas.”91 In order to
90
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maintain the coalition for independence, Landsbergis,
himself originally from Kaunas, rose to represent both
factions by 1990. In order to contain the Kaunas nationalists
within Sąjūdis, Landsbergis became more extreme in his
rhetoric, demanding a complete separation from the Soviet
Union. This trend resulted in alienating many of those in
Sąjūdis who desired moderation.
The Baltic Way represented the crest of a tidal wave
of populist expression. Sąjūdis was highly active in
organizing the Baltic Way, collecting signatures and
spreading information to the population. Organizing efforts
were met with enthusiasm, and as time went on participation
in demonstrations increased. The Lithuanian people clearly
desired freedom from one-party Soviet rule. Populism was
the defining political catalyst for change in 1989, and
continues to define Lithuanian politics today. Populism in
Lithuania defines populism as a style, not an ideology,
meaning populism brought together individuals with
differing political principles.92 The roughly two million
participants in the Baltic Way were responding to nationalist
sentiment that appealed to capitalists and Communists alike.
The Baltic Way demonstration should be historically viewed
as an expression against the Soviet concentration of power,
not as an anti-socialism movement. Independence was the
main political concern of the people, as is evident in this
1991 survey asking: “‘Do you agree that the Lithuanian state
should be an independent, democratic republic?’ About 85
percent of eligible voters participated and 90 percent said
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yes.”93 The level of activism the population showed toward
political elections was significantly less. The role of Sąjūdis
in the mass demonstrations of 1989 is uncontested, but the
transition from protest movement to political party is more
muddied. Popular voting for the newly independent
parliament barely exceeded 50 percent participation, the
minimum by law to count as an election. According to
European Parties Elections and Referendums Network
(EPERN), after the adoption of the 1992 Constitution came
“a general decline in political activity by Lithuanian
citizens.”94 Lithuanians were less interested in supporting
political parties than gaining autonomy from the Soviet
Union.
Nationalist Direction
After losing to Landsbergis for head of state in 1990,
Brazauskas changed his stance on Lithuanian independence.
According to an article put out by The Telegraph,
Brazauskas initially “believed that the old USSR might be
reconstituted as a looser federation of independent but still
Communist states.”95 Reading into the popular sentiments of
the people, Brazauskas continually changed his ideological
position to stay politically viable. As the political
atmosphere grew more factional, the centrist parties refused
the idea of forming a coalition while Brazauskas expressed
93
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a desire for compromise.96 Reform to introduce independent
political parties was something the LKP had recommended
under Brazauskas’ leadership. Calls for full independence
however, placed Sąjūdis and its leader Landsbergis, in
ideological opposition to Brazauskas. By February 1990, the
radical wing of Sąjūdis was intensely nationalist, demanded
complete independence, and won on it.97 As Brazauskas took
steps toward becoming a populist through promoting minor
reform, Landsbergis’ persona became more ideologically
hardline. Taking a hard stance brought victory in 1990, but
would alienate Sąjūdis from the electorate in the long run.
Urged on by extremists in Sąjūdis, such as the
Kaunas faction, Landsbergis’ insistence on immediate
independence was less appealing to moderates in his party
and Lithuania in general. Natalia Vekteriene resided in
Lithuania during the political movement toward
independence and she recalls hearing the news about Sąjūdis
coming to power: “They would say ‘the new government is
coming’ and that’s it, you just accept it. You see, we are not
very political people. We, as citizens, just accept a new
government. We did not know it was going to bring a new
order.”98 Uncertainty about the new system by people like
Vekteriene was shared by members within the Seimas.99
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Within three months of the declaration, Landsbergis was
under pressure from his own party to place a moratorium on
independence to improve strained Soviet relations. The
reluctance to put the good of the economy over nationalist
ideology further marginalized Sąjūdis from mainstream
sentiments. Momentarily betraying his ideology,
Landsbergis did capitulate to popular demands to improve
Lithuania’s economic and international standing with the
Soviet Union. A June 14, 1990 issue of The Chicago Tribune
demonstrates the ideological shift by the head of state;
“Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis has maintained
that everything may be laid on the bargaining table except
the declaration of independence. But on Wednesday Landsbergis told parliament that ‘our side should think it
over: how to do some maneuvering without inflicting
damage on Lithuania and on the political path chosen by
it.’”100 As negotiations with Russia failed to alleviate
witnessed the ‘I Want To Work Here’ demonstrations and provides a
millennial’s perspective on Lithuanian politics. Auguste Cichowlas is a
22-year old expatriate from Lithuania. Auguste’s testimony helps to
shed light on how the younger generation views the Lithuanian
government. Auguste is my spouse and was invaluable in facilitating
interviews with Lithuanian contacts. She also transcribed interviews
conducted in Lithuanian into English. Jolanta Baltrusaitiene was in her
early 20s when Lithuania became independent. Jolanta comes from a
rural background, helping to counter the dominantly metropolitan
narrative of the revolution. Natalia Vekteriene was attending high
school in Vilnius during the revolution. Natalia’s experience helps to
show how students were impacted. Thomas Vekteris, in his 20s when
independence was declared, provides a firsthand account of how those
in the capital endured the revolution.
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economic and military threats, Landsbergis abandoned his
cautious rhetoric and pivoted toward full independence in
December 1990. Sąjūdis, under the leadership of
Landsbergis, was ideologically opposed to compromise with
the old regime. The rejection of moderate policies led to the
party’s victory in 1990 and its loss of public support by 1992.
Blockade and Occupation
Military operations by Soviet forces commenced in
the capital directly following the reinstatement of
independence. Soviet tanks and troops occupied strategic
points in the city, killing and wounding civilians. Popular
outrage over Soviet atrocities turned into support for the new
government. Tomas Vekteris was a student at Vilnius
University during the military occupation of the city. He
remembers that “at my University there was nobody
campaigning, nobody was talking about it. Only after
January 13th and 14th everybody started talking that people
died and then everybody started expressing their feelings
that something is happening and that we have to do
something.”101 Another student at the time was Jolanta
Baltrusaitiene. Baltrusaitiene joined the demonstrations to
preserve the parliament building and recalls that “we were
keeping guard by parliament, but only driven by solidarity
to indicate that we really support our government and its
leaders on their aspirations to resist and dissociate from
Russia.”102 Popular support for the reborn republic was out
101
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of protest to Russian aggression, not ideological agreement
with Landsbergis.
The Soviet Union’s blockade of Lithuania’s ports
embargoed essential supplies into the country. This blockade
was crippling to the burgeoning republic. Transforming the
Lithuanian Economy, by Valdas Samonis, explains the
dependent relationship between the Baltic economy and
Soviet imports. Samonis notes that “Lithuanian agriculture
was made heavily dependent on cheap mixed fodder, oil, and
other inputs imported from Russia and other Soviet
republics. The use of local inputs, except heavily
underpriced labor, was limited to a minimum”.103 A New
York Times article from 1990, Soviets Say Blockade of
Lithuania Is Lifted, gives some sense of the social impact,
describing how “hundreds of factories were closed, putting
almost 50,000 people out of work.”104 Economic hardship in
the transition towards independence was not only prevalent
in the industrial sectors, but in rural areas as well. Jolanta
Baltrusaitiene comments on her parents’ predicament
outside of the city: “Those who lived in cities – had bigger
food or fuel shortage, but since my parents are from the
village – deprivation was more related to non-food products
and money shortages.”105 Not only was employment and
supply affected by sour relations with Russia, but
commodity prices shot up forcing the Lithuanian Supreme
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Council to introduce rationing.106 These extreme
circumstances hindered the ability for the Sąjūdis
government to implement privatization of the Lithuanian
economy.
Economic Dreams and Realities
Popular support for independence was coupled with
demands for economic autonomy. Inspiration for free market
reforms came from prominent Lithuanian economists who
joined Sąjūdis.107 By September 1988, Sąjūdis was
promoting guidelines for dismantling the Communist
system. These capitalist reforms were known as “The
Blueprint for Lithuania’s Economic Independence,” or
simply the “Blueprint.” The main directive of the Blueprint
was to increase living standards by making the economy
more efficient. The Blueprint rejected the old regime’s
economic model of resource allocation in favor of costbenefit analysis. To create a decentralized market economy,
the Blueprint called for the creation of a National Bank,
along with a separate Lithuanian currency. Along with
currency reform, state planning and price committees were
to be abolished.108 The Blueprint called for radical and
immediate implementation. Valdas Samonis states in
Transforming the Lithuanian Economy, that “gradual
economic reform is inadmissible, one cannot go step-bystep.”109 Above all, the Blueprint sought to dissociate the
106
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Lithuanian market from that of the Soviet Union. Samonis
claims that before the Blueprint was implemented, “90-95%
of the Lithuanian economy was firmly controlled from
Moscow.”110 Sąjūdis advocated for not only political
separation from the Soviets, but economic separation as
well. The pace and comprehensiveness of Sąjūdis’ economic
reforms matched their extreme stance on independence. Just
as the population initially supported Landsbergis’s
nationalist extremism, they likewise upheld his economic
plans out of protest to Soviet hegemony.
Three months before the Baltic Way
demonstrations, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet passed an
adulterated version of Sąjūdis’ economic plan. The
Communist regime under Brazauskas responded to demands
for radical reform, showing a preference for populism over
Communist ideology. Despite incorporating reforms from
the Blueprint, Brazauskas desired slow and minor economic
change. The final version of the law was heavily watered
down, avoiding issues like the National Bank and currency.
The version of the Blueprint that Brazauskas supported still
gave preferential status to Moscow, failing to create a
separate Lithuanian market. Lithuania’s natural resources
were earmarked for Soviet purposes over national ones.
Most significantly, Brazauskas’s path of minor reform
helped to preserve the relationship between central
economic planning and enterprises.111 Far from economic
independence or free markets, the Communist form of the
Blueprint did not go far enough to win over the populist
surge of activism occurring across the country.
110
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Dissatisfaction with the pace of economic change was a
leading factor for Brazauskas’s electoral defeat in 1990.
The promises of higher living standards through
privatization won populist support for economic reforms.
Once Sąjūdis was put into power, however, the ideology of
privatization lacked the mass support it had held in 1990.
Jolanta Baltrusaitiene remembers when privatization was
introduced: “We were hurt pretty bad economically. I can say
that the majority of provincial people who were less
economically educated lost their jobs after the privatization.
After the collective farms were torn up, they were not
satisfied with free Lithuania.”112 Gediminas Cerniauskas
published Emerging Market Economy in Lithuania, which
tracks Lithuanian economic reformation from controlled
economy to a free market. Cerniauskas defines the years
1990-1994 as the “initial transition period for Lithuanian,
which – witnessed a 43.86 percent fall in real [Gross
Domestic Product] GDP and 318 percent annual
inflation.”113 With such an extensive recession,
Baltrusaitiene’s testimony is hardly unique to the provincial
region. Natalia Vekteriene experienced the initial transition
period from the capital: “It was complete turmoil, factories
shut down, no one was producing anything because a lot of
the factories were making things for the army.”114 This
statement is supported by Cerniauskas’s analysis that the free
government of Lithuania made the decision to drastically
112
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reduce production of military goods, negatively impacting
GDP.115 By September 1991, Russia had recognized
Lithuania’s independence, but economic conditions were
slow to improve in the Baltic state. Instead of ushering in a
free market economy, which was an ideological priority for
Sąjūdis, the conservative government had initiated price
controls and vouchers. Natalia Vekteriene recalls that, “the
stores were as empty as before, but now you also have
vouchers. Queues and queues of people, everybody would
stand in lines, just like before.”116 Between 1990 and 1992,
Lithuania’s real GDP had plummeted nearly 50 percent.117
Despite Sąjūdis’ long-term policies of privatization and
competitive markets for Lithuania, full implementation of a
free market was not achieved. Due to the abrupt reforms,
coupled with a Russian embargo, Lithuania experienced an
economic crisis. On the eve of the 1992 election, public
demands to halt reforms intensified. Sąjūdis was unable to
achieve its economic goals and was subsequently voted out
of power. According to The National Archive for Parliament
Election Results for Lithuania, the 1992 elections should be
read as the result of “popular anger about the economic
crisis, in particular the fuel shortage since Russia, the main
supplier, had cut off imports.”118 The rise of Lithuania’s free
market was incomplete after independence, despite the
reform party controlling the government from 1990-1992.
After taking initial steps to privatize the market, Lithuanians
115
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rejected the conservatives in favor of a more populist
economic path.
Return to the Old Regime
A moderate stance on breaking from Russia had
initially lost Brazauskas his chairmanship of the Seimas, but
when parliamentary elections were held in 1992, his party of
ex-Communists easily won the first round of voting. Had
Lithuania resolutely voted freely and fairly for the old
regime? There were many similarities between the
Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania (LDDP) and the
Communist Party of Lithuania (LKP), suggesting a vote for
the LDDP was a vindication of the LKP. Brazauskas was the
head of the LKP just prior to its dissolution and resurrection
in the form of the LDDP. Both the LKP and LDDP urged
maintenance of close international ties with Russia. A policy
of gradual independence had been favored by the LKP and
LDDP. The LDDP promoted far left socialism, resembling
traditional Communist governance instead of free markets
and privatization. As president, Brazauskas chose his staff
exclusively from the LDDP. Ausra Park wrote PostCommunist Leadership: A Case Study of Lithuania’s ‘White
House’ 1993-2014, detailing the policies of various postSoviet administrations. Park remarks that “such an attitude
indicated a tendency to avoid openness and keep many
matters secret – suggesting that the presidential office under
Brazauskas was built on a model reminiscent of the Soviet
Politburo.”119 Despite ideological ties to the old regime, the
119
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LDDP coming to power was less a vindication of Soviet rule
and more of a populist backlash to poor economic conditions
and Landsbergis’s decreased popularity.
Evidence that Lithuanians were not enthusiastic
about a ‘new man’ in government is the election of July
1992, when the first popular vote was definitively in support
for the former Communists, and against Landsbergis.120
Adherence to nationalist rhetoric cost Landsbergis, and his
party, the presidency, and parliament. Tomas Vekteris
comments that “probably more people voted against
Landsbergis than for Brazauskas.”121 Landsbergis, as Lieven
explains in The Baltic Revolution, “misjudged the temper of
his own people. He failed altogether to appreciate their dour
underlying pragmatism.”122 Insight into the temperament of
Lithuanians toward Landsbergis can be found in Tomas
Vekteris’s interview; Landsbergis’s message was “to cut off
all the ties with Russia, start from zero, destroy everything.
No compromise, he wants to limit people’s choices. Even
now a simple citizen understands the political life a bit
differently, they see it through their own economic status. If
it is profitable for you to have business relations with Russia,
then they would much rather keep the business going and
live well.”123 Instead of trying to rule with the exCommunists within a coalition government, Lieven claims
that Landsbergis “left the nation more divided than when he
Russian, and Eurasian Studies (George Washington University, June 5,
2015), 160.
120
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became its leader.”124 Landsbergis failed to tap into populist
sentiments after Lithuanian independence, causing the
LDDP to be the more appealing choice in 1992.
One factor for the lack of support Landsbergis
received, was due to religiously-based nationalism. Notions
of divine justice were touted at the expense of economic
pragmatism. According to a Chicago Tribune issue from
September 4th 1990, “eighty percent of Lithuania’s 3.6
million people call themselves Catholics.”125 Politically, it
would seem wise to appeal to religious ideology in such a
monotheist nation. Unfortunately for Landsbergis, religion
in Lithuania was more divisive than uniting. The decades of
anti-religious Communist rule had created suspicion
throughout the population with regards to religious
expression. Natalia recalls her family’s sentiments toward
Catholicism under Soviet governance: “There was no
official religion, but my grandma was still going to church.
My mom was so embarrassed that her mother was religious,
it was embarrassing to face the neighbors but you were also
scared to get caught - you were not allowed to talk about it
or tell people.”126 Although most Lithuanians did have some
connection to the Catholic faith, it did not translate into
political allegiance. Identifying as Catholic should be read in
Lithuania’s case, as identifying with tradition as opposed to
religious ideology. Landsbergis was more concerned with
ideology than political pragmatism, serving to alienate
moderates within the population.
124
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Brazauskas took steps to move Lithuania away from
a competitive market economy. Lieven points out that with
the ex-Communists in control, Brazauskas reinforced “the
growth of unhealthily-close links between ex-Communist
business and ex-Communist bureaucracy and government,
or ‘crony capitalism.’”127 Samonis backs up Lieven’s claim
that the Soviet system returned under Brazauskas. He writes
that “the new post-Communist government quickly resorted
to old bad habits of inflationary wage increases, reversing
some of the effects of the earlier income policies.”128 The
LDDP politicized the economic market. Detrimental to the
Sąjūdis’ Blueprint, the LDDP subsidized businesses, enacted
protectionist policies on imports, and created a currency
board to undermine the National Bank. Samonis points out
that these policies served to “unnecessarily politicize the
whole process of economic transformation.”129 The fiscal
interventionism that the ex-Communists enacted should be
seen as adhering to populist pressures for economic relief as
well as an ideological adherence to a command economy.
From 1992, deficit spending increased thanks to the LDDP’s
economic policy. As Samonis puts it, depleting the county’s
currency reserves was “aimed at propping up consumption
levels in the known populist tradition.”130 In contrast to the
goals of the Blueprint, Lithuania moved toward a corporatist
system under Brazauskas.
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Free Market Government Returns to Power
Public support for Brazauskas and the LDDP waned
as the economy continued to falter. LDDP policies
negatively impacted Lithuania’s workforce, increasing
unemployment rates. By interfering with the National Bank,
Brazauskas helped to create a recession by the mid-1990s.
As voters were scheduled to return to the poll booths in 1996,
Brazauskas’s approval rate sharply declined. According to
the Historical Archive of Parliamentary Election Results for
Lithuania, in the 1996 Seimas elections: “The economy was
at the forefront of campaign debate, as four years earlier
when LDDP had won out on the same basis.”131 Sąjūdis had
broken apart into differing conservative parties, with the
most prominent being the Homeland Union. Landsbergis
had formed this second coalition party out of the ashes of his
political defeat in 1992. Popular opinion had swung back
toward the conservative free marketers as ex-Communists
gained a reputation for inhibiting growth. As the Historical
Archive notes, the LDDP “was criticized for the country's
economic stagnation and had been plagued by financial
scandals.”132 Lithuanians were not willing to adhere to the
ideology of command economy through thick and thin, and
they shifted support to the Homeland Union in 1996. This
politically polar switch was due to economic pragmatism.
Landsbergis promised Lithuanians prosperity through
European Union (EU) membership and increasing ties to the
West. Economic pragmatism has been the driving force
concerning the transfer of power since independence.
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Ideological attachment to the party was insignificant
compared to the promise of prosperity.
The shift from a Soviet model of bureaucracy was
accelerated with the ascension of Lithuania’s second
president, Valdas Adamkus. During the Brazauskas
presidency, reinforcement of the Soviet model of state
resulted in a dichotomy between the presidency and the
Seimas. Not until the presidential election of 1998, did the
Soviet model completely lose out to free market governance.
Valdas Adamkus ran as an independent, allowing him to
obtain votes from moderates within the socialist LDDP and
conservative Homeland Union. Park notes that “the
electorate was looking for a high-impact, change-oriented
leader.”133 By running unaligned, Adamkus was successful
in projecting himself as a populist rather than an ideological
candidate. Despite running as an independent, Adamkus had
strong notions that economic growth would be obtained
through membership into the EU. By focusing on economic
reforms that conformed with EU guidelines for membership,
not only did Adamkus spread a populist message of making
things better for everyone, he implemented substantial free
market changes to the system. The article Post-Soviet
Transformation of Bureaucracy in Lithuania, by Saulius
Pivoras, discusses the dismantling of the Communist
bureaucratic structure. Pivoras comments on the structural
change of government after Brazauskas: “The model
selected was Weberian, which presupposes a strict division
between the spheres of politics and administration. The
major motive for selecting this model was the effort to
133
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abolish the practice of Soviet administration.”134 The
presidential election of 1998 was a rejection of the Soviet
system for its poor economic performance. Populist
sentiments in Lithuania shifted away from the east-looking
LDDP and towards westward-looking Adamkus. Park
writes: “Many voters took a favorable view of him and
hoped that with his half-century in America, he would bring
a fresh, totally non-Soviet approach to government.”135
Valdas Adamkus had lived in the United States since 1949,
easily winning the expatriate vote. His populist message for
closer ties to the West convinced domestic Lithuanians that
he was truly a vote for change. Populist messaging coupled
with economic dissatisfaction once again aroused political
activism to reject whatever ideology belonged to the status
quo.
Continuity of Populist Activism and Economic Protest
Political activism in post-Soviet Lithuania is
routinely unleashed by weak economic performance. The
Communist Party of the Soviet Union had financially
mismanaged its satellites. By the 1970s, Lithuanians were
becoming politically active, as shown in the article, SelfImmolations and National Protest in Lithuania. Political
demonstrations erupted in the late 1980s, but had occurred
previously in 1972 when riots in Kaunas broke out. Tomas
Remeikis is a researcher whose focus is Lithuanian
resistance to Soviet rule. Remeikis claims that “the attack on
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economic policy indicates that perhaps we are witnessing
what has been called ‘a revolution of rising
expectations.’”136 Economic dissatisfaction progressed into
political activism by the 1980s. Samonis reiterates this point,
claiming “economic sovereignty meant something less than
independence in the beginning – during 1988 however, these
terms converged.”137 In the post-Soviet era, economic
demonstrations have continued to occur. This tendency to
take to the streets over economic dissatisfaction supports the
claim that economic performance motivates political
activism. In 2009, economic demonstrations in Vilnius
turned violent. The New York Times described the scene in
the capital; “A group of 7,000 gathered to protest planned
economic austerity measures. A small group began throwing
eggs and stones through the windows of government
buildings until the police moved in, using tear gas and rubber
bullets.”138 Lithuania’s 2009 election appointed an
independent economist by popular vote. Again, candidates
promising prosperity trumped party allegiances.
Economic conditions in Lithuania have continued to
be a point of political contention past the 2009 global
recession. In 2018, Lithuania experienced a protest
movement focused on economic issues. The ‘I Want To
Work Here’ movement was a reaction to the exodus of jobseeking Lithuanians. Poor job opportunities in the country
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inspired protests just a year after the 2017 parliamentary
election, showing discontent for the new government’s
economic policies. Auguste Cichowlas is a Lithuanian
expatriate living in the United States. The recent socialist
victory in the Seimas has come as an upset to Cichowlas:
“The political perspective that the peasant party holds is not
capitalist enough, they focus on agricultural growth and that
is not what Lithuania needs at the moment.”139 Many
Lithuanians feel their country needs to take a new political
direction based largely on improving the domestic economy.
Greta Baltrusaityte resides in Vilnius, and although she did
not take part in the recent economic demonstrations she is
upset with the country’s ruling socialist party. Greta claims
the Peasant and Greens Union “…is a total disaster, they
keep doing reforms and they are terribly corrupt.”140
Dissatisfaction with economic reform and performance
remains a poignant factor for supporting the status quo.
Economic mismanagement recurrently motivates political
activism in Lithuania’s past and present.
Conclusion
The Lithuanian government is not a product of
people’s ideological convictions but a result of economic
populism. When the economy fails to benefit the lay person,
Lithuanians take to the streets and the ballot box. Because of
the strong desire for economic pragmatism over ideology,
political parties with diverse ideologies have alternated after
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independence. The popular shifts in party support
demonstrates a weak affiliation between the people and
ideological political platforms. The 1992 backing of the exCommunist LDDP was a vote for change, not for business as
usual. Business as usual is what Lithuania got however,
under the Brazauskas presidency. When the LDDP failed to
bring economic prosperity, Lithuanians once again
supported Landsbergis for his message of change. In 1998,
Lithuanians threw their support behind the Western-oriented
Valdas Adamkus. Running unaligned, Adamkus benefited
from the weak ideological ties Lithuanians have with
political parties. Lithuania was admitted into the EU shortly
after the turn of the century. Admittance marks the point
where Lithuanian government and markets had obtained a
level of separation worthy of being called a free market. The
traditional narrative of Lithuania as a capitalist Baltic Tiger
should be applied to the 21st century as opposed to the years
immediately following independence. Populist demands for
economic pragmatism over ideology led the country toward
a competitive market. Candidates promising superior
economic results routinely garner populist support at the
ballot. Populism, economic pragmatism, and weak
ideological affiliation continues to drive Lithuanian
activism. This activism can and has been used to support exCommunists as well as free market conservatives. As the
LDDP and other socialist parties periodically resurge in the
ranks of parliament, it would be wise to read such trends as
dissatisfaction with the status quo and not be misread as the
desire for a return to the former Soviet system.

